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I. INTRODUCTION 
World trade in hazardous products! raises many politically and emotionally charged 
issues which have stirred a continuing international debate as to the degree of regulation, 
if any, which should be imposed on such trade. Many products which continue to be 
imported by the Third World have been previously banned or severely restricted from 
domestic use within the exporting country due to determinations that they pose an 
unreasonable risk of harm to human health and environment.2 Companies typically rush 
to export existing supplies of such products before export restrictions can be imposed.3 
A policy which permits the continued exportation of banned hazardous products is 
attacked by critics as a double-standard. Supporters argue that such a policy is simply an 
expression of respect for the sovereignty of nations, allowing the government of each 
importing country to decide what is best for its own citizens. It is asserted that products 
! For the purposes of this note, the term "hazardous products" refers to products or substances 
which may cause substantial personal injury or illness as a result of any reasonably foreseeable use or 
handling, or substances which pose an unreasonable risk to the environment. It includes products 
subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 
1980 &: Supp. 1984); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-92 (West 1972 & 
Supp. 1984); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-75 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-29 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-81 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); or the Flammable Fabrics 
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1191-1203 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). This note focuses upon world trade in 
pesticides and pharmaceutical products. 
2 Such products include pharmaceuticals, medical devices, pesticides, food additives, and fabrics 
that have been treated with carcinogenic substances (e.g. TRIS), to name a few. 
a Alston, International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 397, 453 (1978). 
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which are banned from use in developed countries may nevertheless produce benefits in 
the Third World which outweigh the risks. For example, the urgent need for food in 
developing countries may outweigh fears of the harmful effects of pesticide usage. 4 
Developing countries plagued with malaria and other tropical diseases may perceive a 
need to use banned pesticides. DDT, for instance, has been estimated to have saved five 
million lives and prevented 100 million illnesses since 1942.5 Similarly, despite the U.S. 
ban on the exportation of the injectable contraceptive Depo-Provera in 1978, several 
Third World leaders specifically requested that exportation of the drug be permitted in 
light of the special needs of the Third World, such as the difficulty encountered by 
African women using other methods of birth control.6 
It has been said that pollution is a "rich man's disease" which poor countries would be 
delighted to contract,1 and that those who argue for stricter controls over hazardous 
exports do not speak for the lesser developed countries.8 There is, however, considerable 
evidence to the contrary. Many Third World leaders have expressed a strong desire for 
stricter controls on hazardous exports. In 1977, a Kenyan official stated that developing 
countries would no longer tolerate being used as dumping grounds for unwanted prod-
ucts or "guinea pigs" for those which are untested. 9 In November 1980, thirty-one 
consumer advocates from thirteen countries signed the "Penang Declaration on the 
Export of Hazardous Substances and Facilities" urging "all governments to establish 
export control programmes for hazardous substances."10 They specified that only in 
specific exceptional circumstances should a distinction be made between domestic and 
foreign consumers. Such circumstances were to be demonstrated by the exporters and 
exporting country governments with full public participation. 
The recent tragedy in Bhopal, India has intensified the debate over the appropriate 
level of international regulation of hazardous substances. That incident, in which a 
noxious gas leak from a pesticide manufacturing plant killed over 2,000 people and 
4 It should be noted, however, that the validity of this notion has been challenged by statistics 
which indicate that more than half, and as much as 70%, of food produced in Third World countries 
is for export, so the "poor and hungry may labor in the fields but they do not get to eat the crops." D. 
WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON 32 (1981). See also D. BULL, A GROWING PROBLEM: PES-
TICIDES AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR 78-86 (1982) (discussing the distribution of costs and benefits of 
pesticide exports to the Third World). 
5 Alston, supra note 3, at 454 (citing Henahan, Whatever Happened to the Cranberry Crisis - A 
Status Report on the Great Environmental Controversies, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1977, at 31). 
6 Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1978, at C6, col. 1. The Depo-Provera controversy was unique, however, in 
that the importing governments had an opportunity and a willingness to evaluate the risks and 
benefits associated with the drug. 
7 Alston, supra note 3, at 445 n.228 (citing Long, Identifying Environmental Options in Development, 
69 DEV. DIG. 34, 35 (1971)). 
" D. BULL, supra note 4, at 147 (citing F.J. Rarig of the Rohm and Haas Company in DEPT. OF 
STATE & U.S. NAT'L COMM. FOR MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE, Procs. of U.S. Strategy Conf on Pesticide 
Management 29 (June 7-8, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Strategy Conf]). 
9 Export of Hazardous Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 
Hearings]. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Nigerian Ambassador to the United States: "This 
Ministry supports the move being discussed by the US Government to ban the exports of products 
[from the United States which have been found to be hazardous to the public health and are 
prohibited from use in the United States], particularly with reference to Nigeria." Id., app. 18, at 405. 
10 "The Penang Declaration on the Export of Hazardous Substances and Facilities," signed by 
participants at the First International Consumer Testing Course in Penang, Oct. 29-Nov. 25, 1980, 
~ l(a), cited in D. MELROSE, BITTER PILLS: MEDICINES AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR 168-69 (1982). 
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caused ill effects among an estimated 200,000 additional people, raised a wide range of 
questions concerning corporate responsibility, training, and educationY It also drew 
attention to the ways in which cultural differences can increase the risk associated with 
products assumed to be safe. As a result, there is a growing sentiment that some materials 
should not be produced in certain countries. 12 
There are currently no binding international controls on trade in hazardous prod-
ucts. The United States has taken some steps toward ensuring that Third World nations 
are aware of the dangers of banned or restricted exports, yet such controls have been 
largely ineffective in protecting foreign purchasers. This note will first examine the 
nature of the problems associated with the exportation of hazardous products to Third 
World countries by focusing attention on two specific groups of such products - pes-
ticides and medicines. 13 The hazardous export policy of the United States as well as recent 
developments at the national and international level will then be discussed. Finally, 
proposed improvements will be evaluated and alternatives suggested. 
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. Medicines and the Third World 
International trade in pharmaceutical products is a 100 billion dollar industry which 
has continued to expand despite the general economic recession,I4 yet millions of poor 
people throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America are unable to obtain medicines to 
relieve suffering or cure illness. IS The Third World has three-quarters of the world's 
population, but accounts for only about 20% of world drug sales. I6 Most Third World 
countries do not have the funds to obtain essential drugs nor the health infrastructure to 
properly distribute these drugsY 
When funds are available, however, they are often misspent on nonessential or 
unsuitable drugs. IS A 1982 study of the drug market in Bangladesh concluded that nearly 
one-third of the country's total drug expenditures was spent on "unnecessary and useless 
medicines such as vitamin mixtures, tonics, alkalisers, cough mixtures, digestive enzymes, 
palliatives, gripe water and hundreds of other similar products."19 Drug manufacturers 
11 N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 2. 
12 Id. As explained by Noel J. Brown, a leading official of the United Nations Environment 
Programme, developing countries "have not internalized the technological culture." Id. As a result, 
workers learn certain steps or techniques but are unable to solve unexpected crises. A 1982 Union 
Carbide inspection report on the Bhopal plant indicated that training consisted of "rote memoriza-
tion" without "a basic understanding of the reasoning behind procedures." Id. Moreover, there is 
reportedly widespread ignorance of the concept of preventive maintenance in developing countries. 
Id. 
13 Pesticides and medicines have been specifically chosen to highlight the problems associated 
with hazardous exports because they are linked with two of the major needs of Third World 
countries - food and health care. 
14 Report of the Comm. on Social and Health Questions, Eur. ParI. Ass., 12th Sess., Doc. No. 
5113, at ii (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Council of Europe Report]. 
105 D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 16-26. 
16 The latter figure is nearer 15% when China is excluded. See 1983 Council of Europe Report, 
supra note 14, at 15. 
17 Id. at ii. 
18 Id. at 1. 
19 Expert Committee, Evaluation of Registered/Licensed Products and Draft National Drug PoliC)' , at 
92 (May 11, 1982) cited in D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 38 n.62. 
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claim that they are responding to demand rather than actively creating the market for 
nonessential drugs; however, the widespread promotion in the Third World of drugs of 
questionable necessity has generated considerable doubt about the validity of these 
claims.20 
Drugs imported by the Third World also do not always comply with safety, price, and 
labeling norms of the producing countries.2! Instructions and warnings often fail to 
convey adequate information due to the technical medical jargon used. 22 Dangerous 
discrepancies between instructions included with drugs sold to the Third World and those 
in developed countries have also been revealed. Among the most striking discrepancies is 
the case of Orabolin, an anabolic steroid with instructions to doctors in Bangladesh that 
the drug "is free from harmful effects on liver ... The raspberry flavoured liquid admin-
istered in drops is especially meant for younger children and infants." Doctors in Britain, 
however, were advised that Orabolin was "not recommended for children" and that 
"tumours of the liver have been reported occasionally."23 
Almost any drug carries a risk of unwanted or unexpected adverse reactions,24 but 
these risks are often greatly magnified in poor countries where powerful drugs are 
dispensed to people who can have no idea of the dangers or the possibility of safer 
alternatives. Even the people who prescribe and sell medicines in poor countries rarely 
know the potential adverse side-effects of the drugs they dispense. 25 Consequently, 
instead of curing ill health, drug use in the Third World has frequently aggravated health 
problems. 26 
The conflicting interests of drug manufacturers and people of poor nations per-
petuate existing problems. Advertising and marketing strategies of drug manufacturers 
have fostered the notion that "the solution to illness resides in the purchase and consump-
tion of medications."27 As a result, the poor in developing countries will even go without 
food in order to buy medicines, unaware that they could better cope with illness if they 
spent their money on food and improvements in health or living standards in the 
community.2s 
B. Pesticides and the Third World 
Pesticides2• have played a major role in food production and public health programs 
m developing nations. 3D Their effectiveness and ease of use have created a growing 
20 D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 43-44. For example, advertising successfully created a large 
market in Mexico for calcium supplements despite the fact that the Mexican people get plenty of 
calcium from tortillas which are soaked in lime. [d. 
21 1983 Council of Europe Report, supra note 14, at ii. 
22 D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 102. 
23 [d. at 103-04. 
24 BRITISH NATIONAL FORMULARY, No.1, at 15 (1981), cited in D. MELROsE,supra note 10, at 97 
n.16. 
25 D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 97. 
26 Id. 
27 A. Ferguson, The Role of Pharmaceuticals in the Process of Medicalization in Asuncion, El Salvador, 
paper presented at the Amer. Anthropological Ass'n Meetings held in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 2-7, 
1980), cited in D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 93 n.4. 
28 Id. 
29 A pesticide is any substance or mixture of substances intended to prevent or control any 
unwanted species of plants or animals and also includes any substances or mixture of substances 
intended as plant growth regulators, defoliants, or desiccants. World Health Organization, Report of 
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demand among developing as well as industrialized nations. 31 The Third World is re-
sponsible for about fifteen percent of the world's pesticide usage.32 
Developing nations, however, have paid a disproportionately high price in human 
suffering and death in exchange for the promise of more food for the hungry and 
freedom from diseases spread by insects.33 Moreover, it is not clear that pesticides 
contribute significantly to feeding the hungry since even in Third World nations, most 
pesticides are applied to luxury, export crops rather than to food staples that the local 
people will consume.34 
Although pesticide usage causes health concerns in industrialized nations,35 a num-
ber of factors combine to make their usage in the Third World particularly hazardous: 
In the Third World illiteracy, lack of training and equipment, lack of 
effective legislative controls, and an especially susceptible population combine 
with the availability of highly toxic pesticides which are often badly labelled, 
poorly packaged and irresponsibly promoted. In addition, the pressures of 
the treadmill may drive people to apply pesticides more often and in greater 
quantities than is desirable either for maximum safety or for the best crop 
yields. The result of all these factors is the regular and widespread incidence 
of poisoning.36 
An incident which occurred In Bolivia illustrates the tragic consequences that can 
result from the irresponsible promotion of pesticides in Third World countries. Accord-
ing to U.N. officials, an "avalanche of salesmen" had persuaded farmers in the small 
Indian village of Comarapa to abandon traditional crop rotation in favor of pesticide 
usage. Instead of causing the elimination of the pests, however, the result was a plague of 
moths which prompted the salesmen to recommend the application of more and different 
pesticides. This only resulted in more resistant moths and a pesticide addiction which has 
the 1975 Joint Meeting of the FAO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues in Food, WHO Tech. 
Rep. Ser. (No. 592) at 39 (Annex 3) (1976). 
30 Dr. A.V. Adam, F AO Panel of Experts on Pesticide Specifications, Registration Requirements 
and Application Standards, U.N. Doc. AGP: 1977/M/4, at 1 (1977). 
31 Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 1, 1978, at 21, col. 1. 
32 D. BULL, supra note 4, at 6 n.20. Pesticide use worldwide each year is approximately one 
pound for every person. Between 1972 and 1980 the market grew in real terms by an annual average 
growth rate of 5%. By volume, pesticide use is expected to grow from 4.1 billion pounds in 1976 to 5 
billion pounds by 1985.Id. at 6. 
33 Although developing countries use only 15% of the world's pesticides, half of the 500,000 
reported cases of pesticide poisonings and two-thirds of the 10,000 fatalities occur in developing 
countries each year. 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BN A) No.7, at 296 Guly 13, 1983) (citing a report compiled 
by Euro-MP Vera Squarcialupi and approved by the Eur. ParI. Env. Comm. Gune 16, 1983)). Note 
that these statistics do not include the number of cancers, miscarriages, deformities, and still-births 
resulting from pesticide exposure. Also, these statistics represent only recorded poisonings and 
deaths. Many incidents may go unreported for a variety of reasons, including government reluctance 
to disclose such data for fear of instigating investigations which could have a detrimental effect on 
their export business (of food to the United States, for example). According to the World Health 
Organization, someone in the Third World is poisoned by pesticides every 60 seconds. Christian Sci. 
Mon., Apr. 6, 1984, at 9, col. 1. 
34 Consumers Ass'n of Penang, Memorandum to the Ministry of Agriculture on the Need for 
Comprehensive Legislation and Administration of Pesticides - A Call for Reform 14 (Mar. 15, 
1983). 
35 The recent controversy in the United States over the use of EDB as a fumigant on grains and 
fruit is a good case in point. See 7 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No.3, at 76-77 (Mar. 14, 1984). 
36 D. BULL, supra note 4, at 40. 
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been described as the "pesticide treadmill."37 Some of the farmers subsequently commit-
ted suicide by drinking the pesticides which had destroyed their crops. Reportedly they 
thought they were "the killers of Pachamama - Mother Earth."38 
Of course, most pesticide poisonings are purely accidental. Nevertheless, the Com-
arapa incident demonstrates how an irresponsible disregard for cultural differences can 
have a devastating impact on the Third World, a point often neglected by policy-makers 
in exporting countries.39 
Another fact often neglected is that local conditions frequently make proper han-
dling of pesticides impossible even if the pesticides are properly packaged and labeled. 
For example, there may be no clean water supply for washing after application of 
pesticides, it may be too hot to wear the necessary protective clothing, or the clothing may 
be unaffordable:o 
Many people in developing countries are unaware of the dangers associated with 
pesticides. They think of pesticides as beneficial "miracle drugs" because they kill worms 
and bugs and help subsistence.41 In Latin America, workers reportedly come home with 
their clothes soaked with pesticides and sleep in them.42 In 1976, at least five Pakistanis 
died and 2900 became ill after sprayers mixed malathion with their bare hands, washed 
their spraying equipment in local water supplies, and spilled the pesticide, which can be 
absorbed through the skin, in areas where barefoot children played.43 
In 1978, Third World countries imported one billion dollars worth of pesticides.44 
Pesticides which had been banned or severely restricted from domestic use within the 
exporting country constituted a significant portion of these imports. In 1979, twenty-five 
percent of all pesticides sold overseas by U.S. companies were products whose use was 
prohibited or severely restricted in the United States because of the dangers posed to 
health, safety, or the environment.45 Although any chemical substance may pose serious 
health and safety risks when used improperly, the special dangers of these domestically 
banned and restricted pesticides suggest that they may have a particularly devastating 
effect in developing countries. Moreover, the hazards of exported pesticides that have 
been banned or severely restricted domestically are not confined to Third World popula-
37 Id. at 4. This increasing dependency upon pesticides begins when certain insects within a 
species survive pesticide spraying and then breed with other survivors to produce progeny which also 
have the traits needed to survive. In this way, large populations of pests become resistant to 
pesticides. Additionally, pesticides often eliminate predator species thereby allowing the populations 
of prey species to multiply unchecked. See R. VAN DEN BOSCH, THE PESTICIDE CONSPIRACY 14-31 
(1980). 
3. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at AI, col. 3. 
39 See generali)', 5 CULTURAL SURVIVAL NEWSLETTER, No.3, at 1-8 (1981) (part one of a three-part 
series published by Cultural Survival Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts on the problems posed by the 
exportation of toxic substances for ethnic minorities and tribal societies throughout the world). 
40 D. BULL, supra note 4, at 38-53. 
41 N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,1982, at 1, col. 2 (quoting A. Karim Ahmed, research director for the 
Natural Resources Defense Council in New York). 
42 Id. 
43 Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at AI, col. 3. 
44 N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (citing the Aug.-Sept. 1984 issue of World Health, the 
magazine of the World Health Organization). Two-thirds of the world's pesticide exports come from 
companies operating in Western Europe, especially the U.K. and Switzerland. 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. 
(BNA) No.4, at 159 (Apr. 13, 1983). Approximately 15% come from companies based in the United 
States.ld. 
45 GAOR No. CED-79-43, June 22, 1979. 
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tions. Travelers may be exposed46 as may workers in the original manufacturing plantsY 
A "boomerang effect" can also take place whereby pesticides return in the form of 
residues on foods imported by developed countries.4s 
Pesticides can also have a devastating impact upon the environment. Organisms pick 
up pesticides that have washed into rivers and fish can concentrate these chemicals in 
their bodies. These chemicals are then transported through food chains to humans and 
other animals.49 Thailand was recently reported as suffering perhaps the greatest ecologi-
cal disaster in its history - a mammoth fish kill which officials blame on agrochemicals.5o 
Careless spraying sometimes causes pesticides to drift into forests and jungles, killing off 
beneficial non-target species5 ! and harming ponds, canals, livestock, and even children.52 
The problem of environmental damage is particularly severe in the case of or-
ganochlorine insecticides, such as DDT and chlordane, which can persist in the environ-
ment for many years after application. 53 The other major group of pesticides, or-
ganophosphates such as malathion and parathion, degrade more rapidly but are more 
acutely toxic and therefore require greater care in handling, applying, and storing. 54 
The negative impact of pesticides on the environment is not limited to direct adverse 
effects on human and animal populations. Studies of coffee plantations in Kenya indicate 
that the heavy use of fungicides has so poisoned the soil with copper-based chemicals that 
no other crops can be grown there and even the coffee trees are beginning to show signs 
of copper damage. 55 Although the coffee crop reportedly poses no health hazard because 
copper does not concentrate in the coffee beans, the contaminated soil poses a threat to 
Kenya's agricultural future. 56 
46 Note, Exportation of Hazardous Products, 7 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 269, 273 (1979-1980). 
47 A tragic illustration of this occurred at Allied Chemical's Hopewell, Virginia plant where the 
pesticide Kepone was produced primarily for export. In 1975, an employee complained to a doctor 
of tremors, weight loss, quickened pulse rate, unusual eye movements, and a tender, enlarged liver. 
On a subsequent tour of the plant, the state epidemiologist found that seven out of ten production 
workers had such a severe case of "the shakes" that they required immediate hospitalization. 
Seventy-five employees suffered acute Kepone poisoning and high levels of Kepone were discovered 
in some of their family members as well. Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENV. L. 645, 652-53 (1978). 
48 D. WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 27-30. Between seven and ten percent of all imported 
food in the United States is contaminated by pesticides, some of which are banned or severely 
restricted as dangerous to human health. Report on Export of Products Banned by U.S. Regulatory 
Agencies, H.R. REP. No. 1686, 95th Cong., Oct. 4,1978. A 1978 FDA study of coffee imported to the 
United States, for example, reported that 45% of the samples tested contained pesticide residues 
which were illegal under U.S. standards. Christian Sci. Mon.,Jan. 5,1983, at 23, col. 1 (commentary 
by Ward Morehouse). 
49 13 R. KIRK & D. OTHMER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY 430-31 (3d ed. 1978). 
50 L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 5. 
5! SAHABAT ALAM MALAYSIA, PESTICIDE PROBLEMS IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY - a Case Study of 
Malaysia 8-9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MALAYSIAN STUDY]. 
52 L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 1983, part I. 
53 R. KIRK & D. OTHMER, supra note 49, at 414, 430. 
54 [d. Concerns about environmental damage and problems of pest resistance have prompted a 
general shift in usage from organochlorine insecticides to organophosphates, however, organophos-
phates are now the cause of the preponderance of insecticide poisonings throughout the world. [d. at 
414,453. 
55 Christian Sci. Mon., May 3, 1983, at 13, col. 2. 
56 [d. 
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III. U.S. HAZARDOUS EXPORT POLICY 
The United States has strict regulations governing the domestic registration and use 
of hazardous products, but when these products are labeled for export they generally 
become exempt from domestic standards.57 This r.esults in a policy of caveat emptor 
whereby Americans are protected from the hazards of these products, but foreign 
purchas~rs buy at their own risk. Nevertheless, the United States has recognized some 
responsibility toward regulating hazardous exports. Thus far, this has consisted primarily 
of notification and labeling requirements. Rarely are products completely banned from 
export.58 In the words of U.S. Congressman Michael Barnes, "[u]nder current law, 
companies can pretty much export whatever they can convince unsuspecting people 
abroad to buy."59 
A. Medicines 
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,60 food, medical devices, drugs, and cosme-
tics may be exported if they are properly labeled, accord with the specifications of the 
foreign purchaser, and do not violate the laws of the foreign country.61 The Act, as 
amended in 1976, provides that new drugs may not be exported unless they are approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for domestic uses, except under very limited 
circumstances.62 New drugs also must comply with domestic labeling requirements prior 
to exportation.63 On the other hand, old drugs, i.e. those developed before 1938, remain 
largely unregulated and may be exported without notice to the FDA even if adulterated, 
misbranded, or expired. 
B. Pesticides 
Pesticide exports are regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act (FIFRA).64 Manufacturers are required to properly label exports in both 
English and the language of the importing country. For pesticides not registered in the 
United States or which are being exported for a use which has been cancelled or 
suspended in the United States, the exporter must obtain a signed statement acknowledg-
ing an understanding that the pesticide is not registered for use in the United States.65 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is then responsible for ensuring that a copy 
57 7 V.S.C.A. § 1360(a) (West 1980). Consumer products that have never been distributed in the 
Vnited States are also generally exempt. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 V.S.C.A. § 2067 (1982). 
58 See generally Comment, State Responsibility and Hazardous Products Exports: A Solution to an 
International Problem, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 116, 123-25 (1983) (discusses various categories of export 
controls). The only products which are totally banned from export are misbranded cosmetics and 
drugs, biological products, and certain meat and poultry products. Products such as household 
chemicals, consumer goods, chemical substances, and fabrics may be banned from exportation if they 
pose a risk to human health or the environment of the Vnited States unless they are not offered for 
sale domestically. Id. at 125. 
59 1980 Hearings, supra note 9, at 3 (statement of Hon. Michael D. Barnes). 
60 21 V.S.C.A. §§ 301-92 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984). 
61 /d. § 381(d)(I)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1984). 
62 Id. § 381(d). 
63 House Comm. on Government Operations, Report on Export of Products Banned by V.S. 
Regulatory Agencies, H.R. Doc. 1686, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978). 
64 7 V.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1984). 
65 Id. § 1360(a)(2). 
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of the statement is sent to the appropriate government officials of the importing coun-
try.66 These officials may then request additional information from the EPA, such as 
information about available substitutes. 
The United States has earned recognition as a leader in pesticide regulations.67 
Nevertheless a number of flaws in the U.S. regulatory scheme have been exposed. For 
example, export notices may not always reach their destination68 and even when they do, 
they may not assure proper pesticide use since the pesticide user is not included in the 
notification process. Also, the EPA often has no information on specific pesticides to send 
to foreign purchasers since many of these products have never been registered in the 
United States.69 Even when health and safety data does exist, the EPA is prohibited from 
disclosing it to other governments.70 
C. Recent Developments 
The Reagan Administration has made clear its opposition to tighter controls on 
hazardous exports. Shortly after taking office, President Reagan revoked former Presi-
dent Carter's Executive Order No. 1226471 which had established a comprehensive U.S. 
policy on the export of banned or significantly restricted substances.72 The Carter policy 
was an attempt to further the foreign policy interests of the United States by relying 
primarily on regularized notification procedures, an annual report summarizing regula-
tory actions, and participation in international efforts to improve standards and practices 
with respect to banned or significantly restricted substances. Under the authority pro-
vided in the Export Administration Act,73 the U.S. government would also, in limited 
cases involving extremely hazardous substances, evaluate the risks and benefits associated 
with use· of those substances and require a validated export license. 
President Reagan rejected this policy, claiming that it resulted in "a cumbersome 
regulatory program, costly to both the public and private sectors."74 He requested instead 
that Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige 
review existing practices relating to the export of hazardous substances and propose 
66 Id. 
67 NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASSOCIATION (U.S.), REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON THE CODEX AUMENTARIUS INTERNATIONAL PESTICIDE RESIDUE LIMITS 61 (May 5,1976). 
68 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BN A) No.7, at 296 (July 13, 1983) (citing testimony of Don Clay, acting 
assistant administrator for EPA's Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, before the House 
Agriculture Subcomm. on Dept. Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture (June 9, 1983». 
According to a U.S. Commerce Department official, one way in which U.S. firms evade the intent of 
notification requirements is by establishing foreign subsidiaries, shipping the hazardous materials to 
them, accompanied by an official notice, and then reshipping them elsewhere without any official 
notification. 216 SCIENCE 1301 (1982). 
69 Id. 
70 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h (West 1980). The EPA has unsuccessfully sought legislation to allow it to 
release health and safety data to foreign governments. 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No.7, at 296 (July 
13, 1983). The release of such data is opposed by domestic pesticide manufacturers who claim that 
they would be placed at a competitive disadvantage against foreign manufacturers who could use this 
data as a means of entering foreign markets in competition with U.S. firms. H.R. REP. No. 343, 95th 
Cong.,.2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1966, 1969. 
71 Exec. Order No. 12,264, 46 Fed. Reg. 2659 (1981). 
72 46 Fed. Reg. 1243 (1981). 
73 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-20 (West Supp. 1984). 
74 Memorandum from President Reagan to the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of 
State (Feb. 17, 1981) (requesting review of hazardous substances export policy), reprinted in 5 INT'L 
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 506 (Nov. 10, 1982). 
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specific statutory or regulatory revisions to remove any "conflicting, duplicative or exces-
sively burdensome requirements," and provide for a more "consistent and cost-effective" 
export policy.7s Haig and Baldrige responded with a report recommending a number of 
changes, the most controversial being a proposal to end the ban on commercial exports of 
drugs and biologicals that have not been approved for use in the United States but which 
can be lawfully marketed overseas, a move that has been pushed for several years by drug 
manufacturers.76 The report also recommended the elimination of shipment-specific 
notification except upon export of substandard consumer products. Rather than requir-
ing companies to report to the appropriate U.S. agency and to notify the importing 
country when they plan to export a restricted product, the report recommended stan-
dardized notification by the Department of State to all countries when U.S. regulatory 
actions are taken. This information would be supplemented by an annual summary of 
such notices including a list of products which are manufactured in the United States but 
are banned from sale within the United States. 
The stated purpose of these changes was to reduce the regulatory burden on both 
individual firms and the U.S. government while shifting the focus of attention from the 
source of hazardous exports to the nature of such products. This would theoretically 
allow foreign governments sufficient access to pertinent information to make informed 
judgments about hazardous products.77 Implementation of the new policy would likely 
require new legislation and changes in current regulations, reversing the trend toward 
stricter control over hazardous exports.78 It appears that the Reagan Administration is 
attempting to compromise the position of the United States as a leader in the develop-
ment of a responsible hazardous export policy just when momentum has been building 
internationally for stricter export controls.79 
While the Reagan Administration has attempted to implement its new anti-
regulatory approach, some members of Congress have been attempting to tighten re-
quirements on hazardous exports. The proposed Pesticide Import and Export Act of 
1983,80 for example, would require exporters to submit more information about unregis-
tered hazardous products to the EPA to be used in an annual report prepared by the 
Administrator in collaboration with the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of State, and 
Commissioner of the FDA, identifying overseas pesticide use patterns. It would require 
75 Id. 
76 11 WASH. INT'L Bus. REP. (lBGC) No. 11, at 2 (May 31, 1982). See also 216 SCIENCE 1301 
(1982). 
77 Report to the President on the Review of u.s. Hazardous Substances Export Policy; Cover 
Letter to U.S. Trade Representative from Secretaries Haig and Baldrige, reprinted in 5 INT'L ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) No.6, at 267-68 Oune 19, 1981). 
7. See Draft U.S. Exec. Order on Exports of Banned or Restricted Products, Substances, 
submitted by the U.S. Trade Representative (Aug. 24, 1982), reprinted in 5 INT'L ENV'T REp. (BNA) 
No. II, at 505 (Nov. 10, 1982). 
79 For a discussion of recent international trends, see infra text accompanying notes 131-47. S. 
Jacob Scherr, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has criticized this 
abrupt change in policy, saying: "It is hard to imagine that the government could propose a policy 
with no real checks on hazardous exports - a policy that would use foreigners as guinea pigs. It's just 
unbelievable." 216 SCIENCE 1301 (1982). The NRDC is a national non-profit organization dedicated 
to the goals of "protecting our natural resources, preserving the wilderness, and improving the 
quality of our environment." NRDC, INC. ANN. REP. 2 (1982-83). Its International Project has a close 
working relationship with the United Nations and has played an active role in assisting passage of the 
1982 U.N. General Assembly resolution on the export of hazardous substances. Id. 
80 H.R. 3254, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
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exporters to give foreign importers information on the products' adverse environmental 
effects, prohibit the import of foods with residues of cancelled or suspended pesticides, 
and encourage more international exchange of information. Officials of a government 
that wanted to import an unregistered pesticide from the United States would be required 
to contact the EPA, describe the intended use, and acknowledge receipt of information 
regarding the pesticide's unregistered status, possible adverse effects, and the availability 
upon request of certain scientific documents on the pesticide. Prior to export of an acutely 
toxic pesticide, officials of the importing government would be required to sign a state-
ment acknowledging an understanding of the hazards associated with exposure to the 
pesticide. The statement would also be required to include the steps to be taken to ensure 
that appropriate instructions regarding the safe handling, use, and disposal of the 
pesticide would be contained on the label and would be accessible, to the extent practica-
ble, to the user of the pesticide.8! 
In 1984, a House subcommittee held hearings on the Pesticide Import and Export 
Act. However no further action was taken on the bill by the 98th Congress82 and it has not 
yet been reintroduced. 
Another proposed bill, the FIFRA Reform Act of 1983,83 also attempted to tighten 
up existing pesticide laws. This Act consisted of a number of amendments to FIFRA, 
concentrating on the improvement of registration procedures and requirements and 
greater public disclosure of scientific information. The FIFRA Reform Act addressed the 
lack of reliable, current health and safety information, a major loophole in the current 
regulatory scheme which the proposed Pesticide Import and Export Act overlooked. 
Older pesticides, some dating back to the 1940's, were registered prior to the develop-
ment of adequate safety standards and a majority of the most commonly used pesticides 
do not comply with the most vital data requirements.84 Before these importing govern-
ments can make truly informed choices, complete registration information on these 
chemicals must be obtained, particularly in the case of exportation to Third World 
countries, since most of these countries lack the necessary resources and expertise to 
conduct their own tests or the mechanisms to make such information available to their 
public. 
Similarly, the information that is available must be accurate. The FIFRA Reform Act 
addressed the problem of falsified test data, most recently brought to light by the IBT 
scandal,85 by making it easier to withdraw from the market those pesticides whose 
registrations depended upon such distorted data. 
81 Id. § 3(b). 
82 The bill was never voted out of the House Subcommittee on Department Operations, 
Research, and Foreign Agriculture. Telephone interview with Nick Ashmore, staff assistant to the 
House Agriculture Committee (Mar. 4, 1985). 
83 S. 1774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONGo REC. S11592 (1983). 
84 Id. (statement of Sen. Proxmire). The Senator went on to cite the results of an investigation 
by the House Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture which 
estimated that at least 60% of major pesticides have not been tested for their carcinogenicity, over 
90% of major pesticides have not been tested for their potential to cause genetic mutations, and at 
least 70% of major pesticides in use have never been tested for their potential to cause birth defects. 
Id. 
85 A major chemical testing laboratory, Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories (IBT) was discovered to 
have falsified the results of numerous chemical safety tests, with less than 10% of over 2,000 key 
product safety tests found to be scientifically valid. Schneider, IBT-Guilty, How Many Studies Are No 
Good?, AMICUS JOURNAL, Fall 1983, at 4. 
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The FIFRA Reform Act, recently reintroduced in the Senate,H6 represents an impor-
tant step toward a more responsible hazardous export policy. Nevertheless, in 1983, EPA 
Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus, said he needed more time to study the law, so 
FIFRA was extended without change. In 1984, the position of the EPA was that it could 
close many of the loopholes in FIFRA administratively and that it would return to 
Congress in 1985 if any legislation was needed. ~7 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF A UNILATERAL ApPROACH 
Unilateral efforts to tighten control over the exportation of hazardous products 
eventually encounter obstacles which can only be removed through international cooper-
ation. A purely unilateral approach by exporting countries raises the likelihood that 
industry will attempt to bypass stringent controls by relocating to free trade zones.~ 
Although the United States can enforce its laws within its own borders, it is difficult to 
enforce these laws on American firms operating in other countries when these laws 
conflict with the law or policy of the foreign country.89 
A unilateral approach by the United States is criticized as being too paternalistic in 
that it imposes U.S. standards on other nations and deprives these countries of their 
sovereign right to choose the products they want imported. oo Concern has also been 
expressed over the possibility that stringent controls by the United States will have a 
detrimental effect on diplomatic interests by generating animosity and raising questions 
as to the reliability of U.S. firms as suppliers. This, in turn, could encourage importing 
nations to rely on other countries, thereby aggravating the U.S. trade deficit as well as 
threatening the health and safety of the Third World population through a shift to 
products which may be less effective or more dangerous. 
A multilateral approach to the regulation of hazardous exports, on the other hand, 
would minimize the concerns raised by a unilateral approach and would create a climate 
in which previous unilateral regulations could function more efficiently. Uniform testing 
and notification procedures would spread the costs of regulation more evenly and would 
help prevent the burden of multiple requirements. Information about hazardous prod-
ucts would be more accurately compiled and importing countries would be better in-
formed. Also, widespread participation in a multilateral agreement would eliminate the 
incentive to industry to relocate in an attempt to escape regulatory restrictions. 
86 S. 309, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
81 It has been suggested that since the Congressional agricultural committees will be preoc-
cupied with rewriting farm legislation in 1985, Ruckelshaus is essentially asking Congress to wait 
until 1986 before considering FIFRA reform legislation. L.A. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, § 2, at 6, col. 1 
(editorial). 
88 American-owned firms often export products from foreign countries. For example, after the 
lethal pesticide Phosvel was banned, the manufacturer, Velsicol Company, continued to export it 
from Panama and Me.xico. When the product was banned in Columbia, Velsicol simply moved its 
remaining inventory to a free trade zone and continued exportation. D. WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, supra 
note 4, at 24. 
89 See, e.g., Fruehaufv. Massardy, [1968] D.S.Jur. 147, [1965]J.C.P. II 14,274 bis (Cour d'appel, 
Paris), where an American-owned corporation operating in France was required to honor a contract 
which violated an American statute and was against American public policy. The corporation was 
required to comply with French law instead, and out of respect for French sovereignty, the United 
States chose not to dispute the matter. Id. See 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966) for an English translation of 
Fruehauf. See also infra text accompanying notes 102-09. 
90 See Alston, supra note 3, at 445. 
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Proposals for the regulation of hazardous products typically encounter resistance on 
the part of developed nations and industry representatives. Nevertheless, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that stricter unilateral controls in combination with international efforts 
to coordinate information and regulation are in the long-term best interests of not only 
the Third World, but developed nations and industry as wel1. 91 
V. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS 
A. The Role of International Law 
Although there are currently no binding international controls specifically dealing 
with trade in hazardous products, there are relevant agreements and precedents which 
offer some guidance concerning responsibility for damage to human health and envi-
ronment. Although not binding on member states, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declara-
tion on the Human Environment,92 provides that 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction or contro1.93 
In addition, the U.N. Charter, a treaty with binding effect,94 obligates member states 
to promote "solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems, and 
international cultural and educational cooperation."95 
The emergence of this sense of international responsibility for human health and 
environment is a natural outgrowth of the principle that a state should not use its 
property so as to harm other states, as established in two leading cases, the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration96 and the Corfu Channel Case. 97 In Trail Smelter, the Canadian government was 
held responsible for the private acts of a smelter accused of emitting fumes which injured 
crops and lumber in the state of Washington. The Corfu Channel Case involved two British 
ships which hit mines in Albanian territorial waters. The court held that Albania was liable 
for the damage, regardless of whether it had actually laid the mines, under the principle 
that it is "every state's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other states."98 Albania was held to have breached a duty to warn 
passing vessels about the hidden dangers of the mines. 
The serious risks posed by exported hazardous products suggest that similar liability 
could be extended to states which fail to warn importing states of hidden dangers 
inherent in certain products introduced into international trade.99 Principle 6 of the 
91 See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
92 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A1CONF.48/14 7 (1972). 
93 [d. at 7.1. 
94 Ratified by Congress June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.I.A.S. No. 993, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi. 
95 U.N. CHARTER art. 55(b). 
96 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 
AM.]. INT'L L. 684 (1941). 
97 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.]. 4. 
98 [d. at 22 . 
.. Comment, United States Export of Products Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HARV. INT'L LJ. 331, 
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United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) guidelines loo offers additional support 
for the imposition of such a duty. Principle 6 establishes a duty of states to notify other 
states when the planned utilization of resources "can reasonably be expected to affect 
significantly" the environment in the territory of other states. IOI 
The duty to warn may also be a basis for liability in a suit brought in the United 
States, under the law of an American state, against a supplier of a defective product for 
injury suffered in a foreign country. Although it is clear that the United States may 
regulate the exportation of goods produced within its borders as it sees fit, the scope of 
American regulatory legislation is not so clear in regard to whether such laws should 
govern activities related to the exportation of hazardous products, i.e. whether Congress 
intended to impose liability and whether the Constitution permits the courts to do so. 
Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America/02 stated that it was 
improper for a court to "impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can 
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States." He suggested the 
use of a conflict of laws analysis to aid in determining appropriate limitations on the 
exercise of regulatory power. 103 This approach generally involves a balancing of the 
competing interests of the parties involved or a determination of which party has the most 
significant contacts with the dispute at hand. 104 
A similar approach was used more recently in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of 
America,105 to determine the scope of regulatory legislation. In Timberlane, a U.S. lumber 
company which milled lumber in Honduras for export to the United States charged the 
Bank of America and others in the United States and Honduras with antitrust violations, 
claiming interference with its export activities. The lower court dismissed the claim on 
jurisdictional grounds. On appeal, however, the court vacated the dismissal and outlined 
a two-step approach for the determination of whether the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction was appropriate. First, the potential degree of conflict between the asserted 
authority of the United States and the law or policy of the foreign government should be 
identified. This should then be weighed against the contacts and interests of the United 
States to determine whether, "as a matter of international comity and fairness," extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction should be exercised by American courts. 106 Although some of the 
defendants in Timberlane were foreign citizens and most of the activity took place in 
Honduras and probably had a more direct effect on the economy of Honduras, the court 
found no indication of conflict with the law or policy of the Honduran government. 
371-72 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Export of Products]. "A state should have responsibility 
beyond ensuring that the emissions from its factories' smokestacks do not harm a neighboring 
country's farmland; rather, responsibility should also extend to assisting importing nations to ensure 
that known dangerous pesticides being produced in that factory do not injure the foreign farmwor-
kers or the consumers of the agricultural products." Id. 
100 United Nations Environmental Programme's Principles of Conduct in the Field of the 
Environment, noted in Handl, The Environment: International Rights and Responsibilities, 74 AM. J. INT'L 
L. PROC. 222, 226 (1980). 
101 Id. 
102 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)(question involving the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act). 
103 Id. 
104 For a more complete discussion of conflict of laws theory, see Comment, International Con-
sumer Protection: Export of Hawrdous Products, 4 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 1,9-16 (1980). Also, see generally, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
105 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). 
106 Id. at 613. 
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Noting that the lower court failed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the relative 
involvement and concerns of the two governments, the appeals court found the dismissal 
on jurisdictional grounds to be unjustified. l07 
The use of choice of law rules has gained increasing support in the context of trade in 
hazardous products.lo~ Although it is unlikely that most Third World consumers injured 
by hazardous products would have the knowledge and resources to assert their legal 
rights by bringing lawsuits against the exporter of those products, it has been suggested 
that "the door is open for large-scale litigation brought on behalf of classes of consumers 
claiming injury to their health and environment."109 
B. International Organizations 
A patchwork of international organizations has emerged III response to concern 
about trade in hazardous products. For example, in 1976, there were at least twenty-four 
international organizations linked in various ways to the international pesticide regulatory 
system. lIO The following discussion highlights some of the major efforts in the field of 
hazardous exports. III 
International concern about the protection of health and the environment, as ex-
pressed at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972,112 led to the 
establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), an inter-
governmental organization dedicated to the promotion of international environmental 
cooperation. 113 Shortly thereafter, UNEP committed itself to the establishment of a 
notification system whereby countries would be warned of the adverse health effects of 
imported hazardous products. lI4 One of UNEP's principle achievements is the develop-
ment of a global pest control training program designed to teach methods for maintain-
ing high agricultural crop yields while minimizing the adverse impact on the environment 
through a special emphasis on the prudent use of chemicals and on the use of biological 
control methods.lI5 UNEP also initiated a program to assist Third World nations in 
107 Id. at 615. 
10" Comment, Export of Products, supra note 99, at 373. 
109 Id. at 374. 
110 The complexity of the interrelationships between these organizations has been clearly dem-
onstrated in a diagram by the National Agricultural Chemicals Association (U.S.). NATIONAL AG-
RICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASSOCIATION (U.S.), REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CODEX 
ALIMENTARIUS INTERNATIONAL PESTICIDE RESIDUE LIMITS 25 (May 5, 1976), reprinted in Comment, 
Agricultural Pesticides: The Urgent Needfor Harmonization of International Regulation, 9 CALIF. W. INT'L 
LJ. Ill, 122 n.56 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Agricultural Pesticides). See also Alston, supra 
note 3, at 409-34. 
III For a more comprehensive description of the role and activities of various international 
organizations regarding hazardous products, see Role of the Information System on Transnational 
Corporations Regarding the Exchange of Information on Banned Hazardous Chemicals and Unsafe 
Pharmaceuticals, ECOSOC Commission on Transnational Corporations (7th Sess.) U.N. Doc. 
E/C.I/90 (1981). 
112 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.48II4 (1972). 
113 G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 43-45, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). 
114 Report of the Governing Council, U.N. Environment Programme (1st sess.), 28 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 25) 36, U.N. Doc. N9025 at pt. 3, 12(d) (1973), reprinted in I INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 183 (B. Ruster & B. Simma eds. 1975). 
"'See Report by the Executive Director, 29 U.N. Environment Programme (2d sess.) 29, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/GC/14/Add.2 at 29-30 (1974). 
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detecting and minimizing environmental injury due to pesticide usage. 116 Although 
UNEP's resolutions are not binding, and therefore serve merely as recommended guide-
lines, they still represent statements of member nations and, as such, are evidence of 
emerging customary international law117 with regard to international trade in hazardous 
products. 
On May 25, 1977, the UNEP Governing Council passed a decision acknowledging 
that "there have been unethical practices concerning the distribution of chemicals, drugs, 
cosmetics and food unfit for human consumption" and urged governments "to take such 
steps to ensure that potentially harmful chemicals, in whatever form or commodity, which 
are unacceptable for domestic purposes in the exporting country, are not permitted to be 
exported without the knowledge and consent of appropriate authorities in the importing 
country."IIH At a meeting the following year, the UNEP Governing Council responded to 
concerns of representatives from industrialized nations as well as from Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Iran, Jamaica; Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines, by reaffirming the 
1977 decision and adopting a new decision directed toward the establishment of a sense of 
shared responsibility between importing and exporting nations in regard to trade in 
hazardous products. 119 
The United Nations General Assembly has also expressed concern about the risks 
associated with trade in hazardous products. In 1979, it passed a resolution urging 
exporting countries to notify importing governments prior to exportation of banned 
hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products. 120 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAa) has become increas-
ingly involved in international information-sharing concerning agricultural pesticides in 
pursuit of its goal to "assure availability of effective products which can be used safely, 
without undue risk to the natural environment or to man."121 In 1972, the FAa and the 
Industry Cooperative Programme (ICP), Pesticides Working Group published a pam-
phlet describing the impact of pesticides on the environment and the role of pesticides in 
developing countries. 122 Although the FAa began as an organization primarily concerned 
with the technical aspects of pesticides, it has since been criticized for being "transformed 
into a critical link between underdeveloped nations and multinational agribusiness 
firms."123 
The international interests of pesticide manufacturers and associations in nineteen 
nations, including the United States, are formally represented by the Brussels-based 
International Group of National Association of Agrochemical Manufacturers (GIFAP). 
GIFAP's position is that "we ought to be satisfied with aiming at the avoidance of undue 
risk" rather than striving for absolute environmental safety which GIFAP claims would 
ultimately lead to increased hunger and disease. 124 
116 Id. 
111 Digest of International Law 547-48 (1968) (M. Whiteman ed. 1968). 
118 UNEP Decision 85(v) (1977). 
119 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.6/1.8/Add.3 (1978). 
120 G.A. Res. 173, U.N. Doc N34/829 (1979). 
121 F AO Panel of Experts on Pesticide Specifications, Registration Requirements and Application 
Standards, U.N. Doc. AGP: 1977/M/4, at 5 (1977). 
122 FAO, PESTICIDES IN THE MODERN WORLD (1972). 
123 D. WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 52. The significant flow of high-level personnel 
between private industry and international regulatory agencies has subjected other agencies to 
similar criticism. Id. 
124 Comment, Agricultural Pesticides, supra note 110, at 125 (citing GIFAP, The Two Largest Threats 
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In contrast to GIFAP, the position of the World Health Organization (WHO) is that 
"the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic 
or social condition."125 WHO is one of only two specialized U.N. agencies which was 
endowed in its Constitution with anything resembling law-making and executive, as 
opposed to purely advisory, functions. 126 Specifically, Article 21 of its Constitution gives 
the World Health Assembly the power to adopt regulations concerning "standards with 
respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar prod-
ucts moving in international commerce" and "advertising and labelling of biological, 
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce." 
Despite these provisions, WHO's success in regulating international trade in such 
products has been very limited. According to Catherine Stenzl, coordinator of the Inter-
national Research Group for Drug Legislation and Programs, a few well-placed drug 
industry lobbyists have been able to undercut WHO proposals for marketing controls. 127 
For example, when WHO proposed to draw up a Code of Advertising for Pharmaceutical 
Products, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations 
(IFPMA) quickly drew up a voluntary code of its own. This voluntary code has been 
criticized, even by some members of the IFPMA, for being unclear, unstructured, and 
weak in the areas of monitoring and enforcement. 128 No steps have since been taken, 
however, to implement the WHO proposaJ.129 
In the area of pesticide regulation, WHO and FAO have expert committees which set 
standards for acceptable daily intakes and maximum residue limits. Although WHO/F AO 
studies have generated a great deal of toxicity data for specific chemical substances, the 
standards and residue limits are not binding on member nations. 
Many other international organizations have been involved in some way with at-
tempts to regulate hazardous products. 13o While conflicting goals, lack of coordination, 
and the unenforceability of resulting proposals have often frustrated the stated goals of 
these organizations, some recent international developments offer a more encouraging 
outlook for Third World nations. 
C. Recent International Developments 
Pressure for stricter controls over hazardous exports to the Third World has been 
increasing. In December 1982, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling for 
to the Future Flow of Pesticides, in GIFAP, AD Hoc GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION ON INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDIZATION OF PESTICIDES REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS (1977)). 
125 See Preamble to the Constitution of the WHO (1946), Basic Documents, 32d ed. WHO, 
Geneva (1982). 
126 W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (1964). The other 
specialized agency endowed with more than advisory functions is the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. /d. 
127 D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 181 (citing Stenzl, The Role of International Organisations in 
Medicines Policy, in 1981 PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH POLICY 228). Reportedly, there is a commit-
tee of drug industry lobbyists operating in Geneva whose sole job is "to infiltrate every international 
institution to prevent mandatory legislation against the ... activities of multinationals." Id. Industry's 
views have been directly represented in WHO proceedings ever since 1971, when the IFPMA was 
officially accorded NGO status within WHO. Id. 
128 D. MELROSE, supra note 10, at 180. 
129 M.N.G. Dukes, World Health Organization Regional Officer for Pharmaceuticals and Drug 
Utilization, Drug Control in International Law 7 (Nov. 4, 1983) (unpublished manuscript). 
130 See Alston, supra note 3, at 409-34; B. Ruster & B. Simma, supra note 114; Comment, 
Agricultural Pesticides, supra note 110, at 117-28. 
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the preparation and regular update of "a consolidated list of products whose consump-
tion and/or sale have been banned, withdrawn, severely restricted or, in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, not approved by governments."131 An arm of WHO, the International 
Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) and the International Program on 
Chemical Safety (IPCS) have agreed to share responsibility for compiling the list. The 
United States was the only nation to vote against the U. N. resolution,l32 claiming there was 
no need for such a list. Because the United States is one of the most valuable sources of 
the information needed for the list to be meaningful, the manager of the IPCS has 
expressed concern that the attitude of the United States will be "one of a whole series of 
political problems which are going to raise their heads once this project gets underway."133 
In the European Community, a recent report approved by the European Parlia-
ment's Environment Committee (EEC) claims that the EEC has a "duty" to help Third 
World countries set up their own legislative provisions on pesticides and to encourage 
integrated pest management as a means for protecting cropS.134 The report stated that 
importing countries, particularly Third World countries, must be notified of any restric-
tions imposed on products within the exporting country. Additionally, the importing 
government would have to explicitly acknowledge that it was aware of this information 
prior to exportation. Greater emphasis would be placed on applicator training and public 
education on pesticide hazards. Specific labeling requirements were also called for, 
including precise instructions for use written in the language of the country and accom-
panied by pictorial illustrations. 135 
The EEC has been under pressure to implement export legislation similar to that of 
the United States. Thus far, however, it has taken the position that it is the sole responsi-
bility of the importing country to establish rules for trade in hazardous products.136 
Adoption of the resolution outlined in the report would establish a policy far exceeding 
the standards now in effect for U.S. exports. 
Other recent developments include: development of a report by the U.N. Commis-
sion on Transnational Companies identifying firms that produce products considered 
dangerous by other U.N. agencies, the formation of an international consumer 
information-exchange network for hazardous products and substances, General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) pressure on governments to "harmonize" hazardous 
export legislation, and work by the F AO on a draft code of conduct for agrochemical 
exports to developing countries. 137 The pressure for international regulation of pes-
ticides, in particular, has become so intense that GIFAP has become "concerned by the 
number of initiatives in progress, initiatives very often motivated by political consid-
erations."138 GIFAP has responded to mounting criticism by establishing its own code of 
conduct - "Principles and Objectives of Product Stewardship and Good Marketing 
Practices in the Export of Pesticides."139 The code places primary responsibility on the 
importing country for protecting health and the environment from the dangers of 
131 G.A. Res. 37/137 (Dec. 17, 1982). 
132 The resolution was adopted by a vote of 146 in favor, 1 against (the United States) and no 
abstentions. 6 INT'L ENV'T REp. (BNA) No.4, at 160 (Apr. 13, 1983). 
133 M. Mercier, quoted in 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No.3, at 97 (Mar. 9, 1983). 
134 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No.7, at 296 Guly 13, 1983). 
135Id. 
136Id. 
137 6 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No.4, at 159 (Apr. 13, 1983) (quoting GIFAPmonthly newsletter). 
138Id. 
139Id. 
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pesticides. GIFAP responded angrily to the vote on the U.N. resolution by saying that 
"the banning or restriction of a product in one country does not signify that this same 
product cannot be used in another country; indeed, this other country may have eco-
nomic and social conditions which lead it to carry out a completely different risk! 
advantage analysis."140 
In the field of pharmaceutical exports, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has recently expressed renewed interest in the development of an International 
Code of Marketing Practices, as was debated in WHO several years earlier. 141 Although 
appreciating in principle the contribution of industry to the maintenance of satisfactory 
standards through the establishment of a voluntary code of conduct, a September 1983 
Council of Europe report noted that the voluntary code remained untested after being in 
existence for almost two years. It recommended, therefore, that discussions resume on 
the establishment of an independently supervised code. 142 
The Council of Europe report places primary responsibility upon the governments 
of importing countries but also recognizes a moral responsibility on the part of producing 
countries to assist developing countries. The report states: "[w]e, in the producer-
exporting countries cannot just watch the world resources being utilised in an irrational 
and irresponsible manner."143 Consequently, the Council of Europe's Recommendation 
969 calls upon member states to "revise, if necessary, their health aid programs, in order 
to assist developing countries with drug evaluation and improved access to useful drug 
information." 144 
The need for reliable information was one reason for the formation of the Pesticide 
Action Network (PAN), an offshoot of the International Organization of Consumers 
Unions (IOCU). PAN is a coalition of nongovernmental organizations based in forty-nine 
countries seeking to end the "indiscriminate sale and misuse of hazardous chemical 
pesticides throughout the world," and to halt "the needless suffering and death occurring 
every day due to the irresponsible and abusive marketing practices of multinational 
agrochemical corporations in the Third World."145 
PAN has advocated withdrawal of the financial support of agencies such as the World 
Bank, the Regional Development Banks, and the FAO, from Third World agricultural 
projects which utilize pesticides that cannot be safely used under Third World condi-
tions. 146 PAN has also called for a halt to the practice of developing and distributing seed 
varieties which require expensive and hazardous pesticides and fertilizers, and has em-
phasized the need to breed varieties tolerant to the pests, diseases, and other conditions in 
particular fields. 147 
14°Id. at 160. 
141 See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. 
142 1983 Council of Europe Report, supra note 14, at 14. 
143Id. at 13. 
144Id. at iii. 
145 Pesticide Action Network, PAN International Calls for Halt to Global Pesticide Proliferation, 
Press Release, Penang, Malaysia I (May 28, 1982) [hereinafter cited as PAN Press Release]. See also 7 
INT'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) No.3, at 77 (Mar. 14, 1984). 
146 PAN Press Release, supra note 145, at 3. The amount of chemicals supplied through 
government assistance programs is quite small, however, compared to the amount supplied through 
regular commercial channels. In 1979, it was estimated that aid programs accounted for only 6% of 
total pesticide exports. D. BULL, supra note 4, at 75 (citing comments of V. Freed in 1979 Strategy 
Conf., supra note 8, at 25). 
147 PAN Press Release, supra note 145, at 3. 
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Acknowledging the unacceptable hardship that would be imposed on Third World 
farmers and public health programs by an immediate ban on chemical pesticides, PAN 
advocates a gradual shift away from pesticide proliferation and toward alternatives such 
as Integrated Pest Management (lPM). PAN has also pointed out the need for aid and 
support from developed countries in order for Third World efforts to succeed. 
VI. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 
It has been estimated that forty percent of all Third World countries have no 
legislation regulating hazardous imports. 148 Countries which have such legislation often 
lack the funds and technical expertise to enforce it effectively. Malaysia's Pesticide Act of 
1974, for example, provides for the regulation of the importation, manufacture, and sale 
of pesticides, however it has not been strictly enforced. 149 
Among the industrialized countries, the United States has heretofore been a leader in 
efforts to control the dangers of hazardous exports. There are several reasons to resist 
recent attempts to alter that status. First, the United States has a moral responsibility to 
take reasonable steps to protect foreign consumers from products judged too dangerous 
for its own citizens. The U.S. commitment to human rights, as expressed in the U.N. 
Charter,150 is a hollow one if it does not extend to protection from injuries associated with 
known hazardous products. 
Cultural differences between industrialized nations and developing nations highlight 
the need for a responsible approach to the sale and promotion of hazardous products of 
western technology. Also, the use of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and other potentially 
harmful products has spread more quickly than the knowledge of their appropriate uses 
and potential dangers. Manufacturers and exporters of these products must therefore 
assume primary responsibility, at least for the time being, for the regulation of these 
products and the dissemination of relevant information. 151 
It is also important to realize that tragedies caused by the usage of American products 
in other countries can lead to increased resentment of the United States. l52 The discovery 
of hazardous effects for which no warning was given may jeopardize favorable trade 
relations. Consequently, export regulations on hazardous products are also in the best 
148 6 INT'L ENV'T REp. (BNA) No.7, at 296 Guly 13, 1983). 
149 MALAYSIAN STUDY, supra note 51, at 11. 
150 The purposes of the United Nations include the achievement of international cooperation to 
solve international economic and humanitarian problems and to promote respect for human rights. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. 
151 This responsibility has been recognized by Frederick J. Rarig, Vice-President of the Rohm 
and Haas Company: 
The pesticide industry of the US must either cease to do business in countries that do 
not meet basic safety standards or it must assume responsibility for securing observance 
of these standards by its customers in these countries while it works with the govern-
ments of these countries and international and regional trade and standards groups to 
develop effective controls of production, formulation, use, and disposal and effective 
enforcement of these controls. 
D. BULL, supra note 4, at 88 (citing 1979 Strategy Conf, supra note 8, at 31). 
152 For example, the recent tragedy at the Union Carbide pesticide manufacturing plant in 
Bhopal, India has prompted predictions of a backlash that would reduce the market for investments 
by multinational corporations in developing countries. Kenneth Rush, a former president of Union 
Carbide Corp. and a former Deputy Secretary of State, noted that deVeloping countries may spurn 
new investments by multinational corporations and "the desperate fear that pervades the world 
because of this incident will create a very bad climate." N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A8, col. 3. 
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interests of U.S. foreign policy in that they help to preserve the commercial reputation of 
U.S. manufactur~rs and distributors. 153 
In addition to preserving existing regulations, the United States should establish a 
system whereby domestically-banned products which are arguably beneficial in other 
countries are subject to strict control. Although there is some support for an outright ban 
on such products,l54 some sort of permit system is more likely to muster the congressional 
support needed for passage. Perhaps a presumption can be established that banned and 
severely restricted products are inappropriate for export. A permit would then be issued 
only if sufficient evidence was produced to rebut the presumption. Such a system would at 
least help to ensure that the most dangerous products are not carelessly exported to 
unwary buyers. 155 Passage of bills such as the Pesticide Import and Export Act l56 and the 
FIFRA Reform Act l57 would also serve to establish a more responsible export policy, 
sensitive to the cultural realities and needs of importing countries. 
The refusal of the United States to cooperate with U.N. efforts to prepare a list of 
banned or severely restricted products l58 lends support to recent criticisms that the 
Reagan Administration is unduly influenced by industry.159 Weak excuses l60 for refusing 
to submit requested information seem to reflect an attitude which contradicts stated goals 
of international cooperation. Although primary responsibility for the safety of Third 
World consumers must ultimately lie with Third World governments and distributors of 
these products, this responsibility can not be exercised effectively without access to 
complete, accurate, and usable information. 
153 Recognition of this fact has reportedly led Ciba-Geigy, one of the world's largest drug 
manufacturers, to support the requirement of notification procedures. 5 INT'L ENv'T REP. (BN A) No. 
11, at 479 (N ov. 10, 1982). Manufacturers realize that reports of unethical marketing practices in the 
Third World can draw widespread attention and cause a significant drop in sales in the markets of 
developed countries, where disapproving consumers may even boycott a product. 
154 See statement of D. Weir before the House Subcomm. on Dept. Operations, Research and 
Foreign Agriculture of the Comm. on Agriculture, June 9, 1983. 
155 Note that a large-scale effort to educate users and distributors is still ultimately necessary to 
prevent poisonings and other dangers associated with hazardous products that are not severely 
restricted domestically but which pose serious risks under the conditions found in many Third World 
countries. 
156 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
151! See supra text accompanying notes 131-33. 
159 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1983, at B-4, col. 4. The Reagan Administration drew similar 
criticism when it was learned that the United States had urged a delay in Bangladesh's decision to ban 
over 1700 drugs made by American companies in order for representatives of the industry to confer 
with Bengali officials. Many of the drugs had been banned domestically. Dr. Sidney Wolfe, director 
of the Public Citizens Health Research Group, accused the State Department of permitting itself to 
be "used by the giant multinational drug companies to promote and protect their exploitation of the 
impoverished citizens of underdeveloped countries." N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1982, at AS, col. 5. 
160 The reasons provided by the Reagan Administration for not submitting the requested 
information have been criticized as "ludicrous and transparent." S. Jacob Scherr, Action Alert, "U .S. 
S~ate Dept. Stonewalls United Nations Request for Hazardous Exports Information" (Aug. 29, 
1983). Scherr explained: "For example, the U.S. complains that the terms 'banned,' 'severely 
restricted,' etc. are too vague. Yet, as noted above, the U.S. was involved in negotiations over the 
language of the Resolution and had the opportunity to raise its concerns then. Also, during the 
Carter Administration, an interagency group on hazardous substances export policy was able to 
develop a definition of these terms in the context of U.S. statutes and regulations. Finally, a number 
of other nations have already provided information in response to the Resolution." Id. 
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Nevertheless, there are some positive developments in the area of international 
hazardous export policy. International agencies and non-governmental organizations are 
taking strong stands against abusive marketing practices and careless export policies. 161 
International channels of information are opening; knowledge and expertise are begin-
ning to be more widely shared. 162 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a growing 
number of Third World governments and the populations they serve are taking a more 
active interest in solving the problems caused by hazardous exports. 163 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The exportation of hazardous products to Third World countries has too often had 
tragic consequences. A growing number of Third World governments are taking steps to 
protect their populations from dangers associated with hazardous exports. Unfortu-
nately, they generally lack the information, resources, and scientific expertise to be fully 
effective. Exporting nations must help gather complete information on hazardous ex-
ports and make this information readily available to potential purchasers and their 
governments in an understandable form. Technical and administrative training on the 
distribution and use of such products should be furnished upon request until a competent 
infrastructure has been established in the importing country. 
There must also be a strong international commitment to the development of safe 
alternatives to hazardous products currently in use. The practice of promoting dangerous 
or unnecessary drugs must be rejected in favor of responsible marketing practices, 
educational programs, and the development and sale of medicines appropriate to local 
ailments. In the area of pest control, there must be a commitment to end pesticide 
proliferation and to promote techniques such as integrated pest management, biological 
controls, and crop rotation. Such techniques would prevent numerous poisonings, help 
re-establish local control over food production, and help protect vital Third World water 
and soil resources. 
Unilateral attempts to address these issues, although helpful, can meet with only 
limited success. It is clear that only a cooperative effort among developed countries and 
the Third World can succeed in. controlling the dangers associated with hazardous 
exports. 
161 See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
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